Translation takes place in two dimensions. The first is a linguistic exchange, roughly equivalent language being substituted for the original. The second is cultural, the new language inevitably giving that which is being translated another hue, colored with its own specific assumptions. Although Luther is remembered by the church primarily as a theologian, nowadays most likely as one with some bad habits, cultural historians point to his translations. He translated the Old Testament in its entirety twice and the New Testament three times, letting Abraham and Sarah, Moses, the prophets, the Apostle Paul and finally Jesus himself speak the Middle High German of Saxony. His Bible has the same place in the German language that the King James Version has in English.

But Luther was also keenly aware of the second dimension of translation. As eager as he was to find linguistic equivalents, he was just as intent on registering the historic witness of the faith in a culturally specific form. One of the best examples of Luther’s achievement at this level is the Small Catechism. Along with the Bible translations, it was a key document in what became in Protestantism a larger effort to move the altar from the church into the kitchen, bringing home the witness of the Christian faith at the family table.¹

This essay addresses Luther’s accomplishment in cultural translation, first, by assessing the significance of the approach of the missiologist Lamen Sanneh to the analysis of the cultural level of translation. Secondly, we assess how Luther works with cultural translation in the Small Catechism’s explanations of the Commandments, the Creed and the Lord’s Prayer. Thirdly, this assessment will be used to make suggestions for confessing the faith in the twenty-first century.

Lamen Sanneh’s Cultural Level of Translation

One of the genuinely revolutionary books in recent years is Lamen Sanneh’s Translating the Message.² Although perhaps not as well
known as he should be, Sanneh is something of an academic superstar, having taught at St. Andrews, Harvard and now Yale. He was born in a royal family in West Africa and was raised a Moslem before converting as a young man to the Christian faith. He is well versed in the history of Islam and has reconfigured treatment of the history of the Christian mission, particularly in Africa.

Sanneh begins with a striking contrast between Islam and Christianity. Islam has worked, he says, on the model of a quarantine. The unmediated Word of God revealed to Mohammed by the angel Gabriel has always to be protected from contamination. Thus, while there have been translations of the Koran into various languages, Islam has maintained a linguistic preserve, insisting on the primacy of Mohammed’s eighth-century Arabic in its formal, religious usage. In contrast, the Christian faith was born at the meeting point of two cultures, Hebrew and Greek. The church came to be in translation. Although Jesus spoke Aramaic, with only a few exceptions the Aramaic has given way completely so that we meet him first of all in Koine, the language of the Hellenists. Pentecost itself is a festival of translation, the Spirit of the Risen Christ breaking out in the mother tongues of all the nations represented in the markets of Jerusalem.

“Mother tongue” is a fertile phrase. As Sanneh carries on his argument, he notes how languages embody specific cultural assumptions. A biblical example supporting Sanneh’s argument is Paul’s use of the term *sarx* or flesh. In his biblically driven apocalyptic, the term describes the self bent on having itself, a drive that can express itself sexually but also religiously. Translated into the vernacular of the larger Mediterranean world, the term gets caught up in what Peter Brown has called “antiquity’s strange embarrassment about the body.” Language learned in the home, on the street, in situations of intimacy and stress, takes on its own connotations—in this case, for the whole of Mediterranean culture. Recognizing the assumptions, dealing with them effectively, is the task of the second level of translation.

Whether or not it recognized this second level, then, Sanneh argues that by translating the message, the church effectively absorbed the cultural relations implicit in the new language into the
biblical text. Here, as Paul Rajashekar, dean at the Lutheran Theological Seminary at Philadelphia points out, Sanneh’s analysis works better for Africa and parts of Europe than it does for Asia, where there were older cultures and written languages. But in Africa and the Western world, the church literally established the cultures it entered, providing not only grammar and syntax for the host language but at the same time implicitly if not explicitly ratifying the assumed relationships. Thus in Sanneh’s analysis, Christian mission has not been, as it is commonly portrayed, a history of imperial cultural subordination. Rather, while there is no doubt about sinners getting loose in the meeting of different cultures, the church’s eagerness to translate has been a hallmark of an inherent openness to other forms of cultural expression. As Luke observes in the story of Pentecost, the hearers asked, “And how is it that we hear, each of us, in our own native language?” (Acts 2:7).

Although to my knowledge, Sanneh does not apply his analysis to the Reformation, in fact it fits closely. As missionaries moved into Northern Europe in the later centuries of the first millennium, the papacy sought to establish a linguistic preserve, enforcing the use of Jerome’s Vulgate and the Latin liturgy. Latin was part and parcel of other forms of Mediterranean domination in Northern Europe, economic, social, political and otherwise. Significantly, when Charles V’s troops broke into Wittenberg in 1547, they announced that they had come to teach the people to speak Spanish, thereby enforcing a further Mediterranean linguistic dominance.

Thus Sanneh’s analysis exposes the larger significance of the Lutheran Reformation. It was the first major attempt to translate the message of the gospel for German-speaking Europe. For this purpose, the reformers put the tradition of the church under a critical check, challenging the imposition of what was idiosyncratically Mediterranean, insisting on the priority of the biblical word proclaimed in Christ. Luther’s goal was to speak the people’s language in such a way as to engage the specific cultural assumptions that went with it.

Further, the Lutheran Reformation carried over in translation to the Scandinavian languages. Johannes Bugenhagen, Luther’s pastor, helped with a translation into low German, laying a basis for translation into Danish and later Norwegian. The Petri brothers
translated as the reform carried into Sweden. While Finnish comes from a different linguistic family, Michael Agricola—who studied with Luther in Wittenberg—is generally considered the founder of modern Finnish, just as Luther himself is considered the father of modern German. The Lutheran Reformation was from beginning to end above all a matter of translation.

**Luther’s Cultural Translation**

The Catechisms, Small and Large, were written at a turning point in the reform. From early on, Luther had been concerned about bringing home his re-interpretation of the faith to the lay people, and had done so by preaching and popular pamphlets. But into the 1520s, the reform that gathered around him remained a loosely grouped, *ad hoc* movement focused primarily on improving the preaching. In the mid-1520s this changed. The Lutheran reformers recognized that they needed to take some more formal steps. The two catechisms, the Small written for parents and families, the Large for pastors and teachers, were the first public results. In them we can see Luther carefully attempting to hand over the second level of translation, that is, to set out the faith in the language of the people.

Luther is generally regarded as a conservative reformer. This characterization grows out of his treatment of the mass, another cultural translation from the mid-1520s, as well as the structure of the catechism. In both cases, he uses standard catholic forms—the Latin Mass and in the catechisms, the Ten Commandments, the Apostles’ Creed and the Lord’s Prayer. The reform is in this way fully traditional and ecumenical, reflecting the self-understanding of Luther as well as his colleagues as loyal children of the church.

At the same time, using the traditional forms, Luther decisively re-orients them. So the Latin Mass, shorn of its sacrificial elements, is re-oriented sacramentally in terms of handing over God’s down-to-earth gifts. And while the catechism is built out of parts long considered standard in Latin Christianity, Luther tunes his explanations so that they will ring true to the heart of his immediate hearers, German families carrying the tradition into their kitchens on poster
boards that could be hung on the wall for use while the family is at
the table. This is the second level of Luther’s translation, as becomes
evident in his treatment of each of the first three chief parts, those
elements that in Luther’s own mind comprised the catechism itself.

Traditionally, both Roman Catholic and Protestant accounts of
the faith begin with the law, under the assumption that the law
was originally given to save and that the Ten Commandments pro-
vide an eternal summary of its requirements. In fact, Luther was
harshly critical of both assumptions. He insisted that from the be-
inning, it was always God’s intention to save in Christ Jesus and
that the law had to be dealt with accordingly. “The law was not
given that it might justify or vivify or prescribe anything for righ-
teousness,” he wrote in the later 1530s.6 Similarly, in a character-
istically colorful sermon of 1525, “How Christians should Regard
Moses,” Luther personifies the commandments under Moses name
and says that as such, they have no place among Christians.7 In
fact, he calls them the Saxonespiegel, or local code of laws, so cul-
turally specific to Israel that they cannot be applied elsewhere.
Clearly, when he explains the commandments in the Small Cate-
chism as well as the Large, Luther is not proceeding exegetically
or attempting a set of eternal standards.

Rather, Luther’s explanations are much closer to hand. Given the
fact that the law was not meant to save and cannot do so, he reasons,
the commandments must have some more proximate value. This
can be seen in the way that they order everyday life, making explicit
what is implicitly required of us in everyday relations with our Cre-
ator, other creatures and the creation itself. Thus, explanations of
the commandments in the Catechism offer a working analysis of
how life works, of what is demanded of us in the working relations
of the day.8 Creatures have to get along with their creator; creatures
have to get along with other creatures; this is what it takes.

Noticeable examples of this are Luther’s treatment of the origi-
nal second commandment and what, in the Roman Catholic num-
bering he took over, has been the third. Calvin restores the
commandment against graven images, on grounds of its biblical
formulation—it is an eternal, unchanging standard for all of life.
Luther argues that it was culturally specific, given to Israel alone,
and that the arts clearly can communicate the gospel. Likewise, on the Third Commandment he steps right around the extended biblical discussion of what constitutes work on the sabbath, explaining that what the commandment really requires is defined by the relationship with God established in the First Commandment. If there is going to be any faith in God’s promise to be our God, we are going to have to hear the Word.

Luther’s explanations of the commandments do have something timeless about them. Again and again, especially in the Large Catechism, people comment that it seems like the explanation was written just yesterday. But what makes them such is their gritty practicality. They are timeless because they are so timely, written out of close observation of the conditions that people are actually facing day to day.

As he turns to the Apostles’ Creed, Luther follows the same method, setting out a translation into the mother tongue, the language of the heart. This is evident, to begin with, in what Luther does not do. If he had frozen a biblical metaphor, as critics have held, the two catechisms and particularly the second article of the creed would be the place for a treatment of justification by faith alone. In fact, as Paul Althaus noted a generation ago, both the language and the conceptuality of justification are completely missing in both catechisms.

Rather, instead of moving conceptually, Luther works relationally, setting the gospel out in down to earth terms. He begins the explanations of the second article in both the Small Catechism and the Large by identifying the person of Jesus and then asserting what he has done: he has become our Lord. This is the non-negotiable, invariable center, reprised in the later phrase of the Small Catechism’s explanation, “all this he has done that I may be his own, live under him and serve him.” The rest of the second article, Luther says, explains how this has happened—namely, “he has bought and freed me, a lost and condemned person, not with silver and gold but with his holy and precious blood and his innocent suffering and death.”

This is the first reference to the power of sin in the Small Catechism. What for later Lutheranism became a necessary precondition for the proclamation of the gospel, a sense of personal need, is for Luther as much a consequence of the gospel. The law drives,
a defining characteristic, but it literally does not know where to go until it has been overtaken by the declaration of the gospel and placed under the direction of the Holy Spirit. Then words like “lost” and “condemned” become appropriate, but only in light of the promise: he “has saved me,” “bought and freed me.”

This points to the way Luther declares the gospel in his explanation. As Robert W. Jenson argued in *Lutheranism: The Theological Movement and its Confessional Writings*, the doctrine of justification is for Luther a “meta-linguistic principle” or better, a grammar for the declaration of the gospel. While the doctrine is not a subject of the catechism, it nevertheless informs the proclamation. So, having declared the Lordship of Christ, Luther begins to preach. Christ claims every verb as subject: he has saved and redeemed, bought and freed. Because he is the worker, the work is whole and complete, utterly independent of my responses, an unconditional act: “all this he has done.” The beneficiary of this work it is clearly identified: it is me, a lost and condemned person, a sinner. Although the action is past, it continues in the present all the way into the future as immediate gift and benefit: “that I may live under him and serve him in everlasting righteousness, innocence and blessedness, just as he is risen from the dead and lives and rules eternally.”

Declaring the gospel in such an immediate, down to earth way, in the explanation of the Third Article, Luther follows the movement of the heart. The promise of Christ’s Lordship, that “I may be his own, live under and serve him,” comes back against me, exposing the fundamental reality of my rebellion. In fact, hearing such a statement, in Luther’s estimation a person is driven to examine the self to see if it has actually happened and then to confess, “I believe that I cannot, by my own understanding or strength, believe in Jesus Christ my Lord or come to him.” At the same time, the promise itself draws attention away from the self to the ongoing work of the Spirit, “calling, gathering, enlightening, sanctifying, keeping,” not only me, but the whole Christian church in the daily declaration of the absolution and the hope of the resurrection.

This dialectic, the *simul*, in which unbelief and faith, sin and righteousness coexist, lays the foundation for the closest thing to Elijah’s unfailing jar of oil and bag of meal to be found in Luther’s
work, catechetical or otherwise: his explanations of the Lord’s Prayer. Living in the world of the nomos, under conditions of life shaped by the seemingly unending demands of life in relationship, in a situation in which the law continuously gets away to turn in attack, believers are at the same time held under the power of the gospel, subject to the freeing work of the Holy Spirit. So Luther argued, “To the extent that Christ is raised with us, so far are we without the law, sin and death. To extent that Christ is not raised in us, we are under the power of the law, sin and death.” Living in this tension, we are, in the words of Ernst Käsemann, territory contended for—a battleground open to all comers. Thus the shape of life in Christ is death and resurrection, the daily dying and rising noted by Paul in Romans 6 and by Luther in the Small Catechism’s answer to the fourth question on baptism.

For this reason, the explanations of each of the petitions has the smell of death. If prayer is simply asking, so, too, we would rather die than ask—asking is a form of death. God’s name is holy in itself; his kingdom comes without our prayer; his will is done without our asking; he gives daily bread to all people however sinful; although he tempts no one to sin, you can never be sure what the good Lord will do next as he “hinders and defeats every evil scheme and purpose of the devil, the world and the sinful self.” There is no resurrection without death.

At the same time, putting us to death with Christ Jesus, God raises us to newness of life. So if the explanations of the Lord’s Prayer smell of the grave, they breathe with an eternal Spring: God encourages us to faith in a language of familial intimacy; speaks the word in its preached and sacramental forms; sends the Spirit upon us to keep us firm in the faith and in the word; softens us up to the gifts of everyday life; frees us in forgiveness; and promises deliverance.

So, as Luther explains it, the Lord’s Prayer becomes in effect a table of contents to the Christian life, exposing the shape of the cross and under it, the hope of the resurrection. While confirming the nature of life in faith as sub contrario, under the sign of the opposite, it at the same time points to the power of the gospel at work just there.

Thus Luther’s catechism is fundamentally a translation. Small or
Large, it takes the defining elements of ecumenical faith to exposit them in the mother tongue. It not only speaks the language of the butcher shop and the tavern, the pew and the kitchen, but embodies that language at the second level of translation, where defining cultural relationships are expressed.

Confessing the Faith in the Twenty-First Century

Robert Kolb has made a critical contribution to confessional Lutheranism in our churches by turning from the noun to the continuing present tense of the verb: confession can only be such when it becomes confessing. Thus the critical and concluding question becomes the one posted, how does Luther’s catechetics serve confessing in the twenty-first century? To take up this question, we look at some contemporary implications for interpreting these three parts of the catechism.

W. L. Morton, a great historian who taught at the University of Manitoba in Winnipeg, used to argue the academic form of a suspicion my Canadian grandfather also held: that a nation founded on the concept of personal rights fatally weakens the ability of the community to regulate questionable forms of behavior. Public discourse over the last several decades especially has compellingly illustrated this analysis. Repeatedly the language of rights has been used to beat down historic standards long regarded as inviolate, the church often enough tagging along a couple of steps behind but making up for its tardiness with equally vehement renunciations. Now pastors teaching the commandments face the most ruthless of judges, one armed with an argument as efficient as a power flush: a hormonally handicapped adolescent slouched in a confirmation class drawling, “that’s just where you’re coming from, pastor.”

The argument for the contextual nature of our knowledge is keyed to the second level of translation. If relationships of faith, hope and love do not involve the language of the heart, they are not working. But in our own cultural context, the melting pot, this argument is used exclusively to disqualify particularly challenging ultimate claims to unchanging and eternal truths. It is not
joined by an equal effort genuinely to qualify, that is, to contextualize at the second level, where we can speak to the heart of what is genuinely demanded as well as given. That is Luther’s effort, an enterprise that needs to be continued in the twenty-first century.

Luther argued, over and against the move commonly made in our culture, that simply dismissing the law is a “play put on in an empty theater.” Writing the law off verbally will only work if the theater is really empty. Real people, living in real situations, face real demands, whether they are codified or even more dangerously, unspecified. Eliminating the word “should” from preaching does not eliminate the inevitable requirements of living in a world of sin and death. All that such verbal elimination accomplishes is driving the requirement temporarily underground, only to have it resurface to claim its pound of flesh, an experience readily observable in family conflicts, sexual misadventures and so forth.

Thus in this cultural context, amidst such verbal gamesmanship, one task of the confessing church is carefully tending the commanding word. We know that the law will not justify, that in spite of its ultimate claims it can neither give life nor save, that at best it is the rude schoolmaster who needs above all to be taught a set of manners. Just so, seeing through its claims to ultimacy, we need to tend its penultimate values. If we do not speak the legal word, our people, caught up in an fundamentally illusory language of personal rights, will hear it anyway and in a context where all alternatives have been taken away. Better us than Moses.

But finally, our calling is the gospel. The law is going to get through one way or another, if not by the ears, then through some other orifice. The gospel of Christ Jesus is an alien word, antithetical to every human assumption. We do not possess it; it possesses us, coming, in Luther’s beautiful image, like a place-shower, a hard driving rain that moves through quickly on its way somewhere else. To assume it is to deny it; to take it for granted is to see it moving off in another direction.

So how do we speak it? It seems to me that it is very helpful to watch Luther’s grammar, the grammar of justification. The risen Christ is not an idea but a person who is even now at work, through his Spirit, in the Word and the sacraments to justify the
godless, forgiving sin, delivering from the powers, raising the dead. To preach him is to identify his activity in the assigned text as continuing into the present for the hearers gathered, so that they are numbered among those who are benefiting by his work and so named without qualification or condition. It is to look the sinner full in the face and say, “In the name and the stead of Christ Jesus, I forgive you all your sin,” to stand by an open grave and say, “this is one of Christ’s own; death shall have no dominion.”

Thus, while alien, the gospel is fundamentally a word in the mother tongue. Whether in its preached or its sacramental form, it comes home by being handed over in the dialect of the home, in the language of the heart. If it does not happen there, it does not happen—a reality that drives us to make every effort to speak it clearly even while recognizing, as Article V of the Augustana has it, that finally only the Spirit makes faith and does so “when and where he pleases, in those who hear the gospel.”

Finally, the Lord’s Prayer. In Lighten our Darkness, his searing cultural critique, Douglas John Hall pointed out the intertwining of official optimism and private cynicism that afflicts genuine hope in our public life. The optimism denies the darkness, setting up impossible expectations; the cynicism, born of the original naivété, feeds its own continuous disappointments, corroding every effort.

“A theology of glory calls good evil and evil good,” Luther argued; “a theology of the cross calls a thing what it is.” Christ’s cross and resurrection together attack both of the false alternatives. The cross acknowledges the reality of discontinuity, dislocation, and loss, of a world and a self at odds with themselves. The resurrection declares the new reality, of life given under the sign of death, hope under despair, faith in the midst of unbelief.

In this way, the Lord’s Prayer sets out an alternative vision, one that can be summed up in a passage from the prologue to John’s Gospel (1:5): “The light shined in the darkness and the darkness comprehended it not.” There is darkness. There is also light. In the end, the darkness will be broken by his dawning.

With this word of tempered hopes, there is a reality that incarnates them. In the growth of the early church, in the entrenchment of the Lutheran reform in Northern European culture, in the immi-
gration of Lutheranism to North America, with the Word there was always the reality of the congregation—that gathering, which gives a voice, hands and feet to join the proclaimed word and the administered sacrament. There the mother tongue is spoken, giving articulation to both the groaning and the delighted sighs of expectation. And there, as at Pentecost, the Spirit is at work to break open the reserve, to spread the Word to every tribe and nation.

NOTES


10. The Small Catechism’s explanation of the Third Commandment does not mention rest at all, but hearing and learning God’s Word; the Large Catechism’s explanation makes rest an occasion for the Word. BSLK 580–586; BC, 396–400; BC-T, 375–379.
11. Paul Althaus, The Theology of Martin Luther, tr. Robert C. Shultz (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1966), 225. In a lecture on Justification presented at Luther Seminary in St. Paul, March 20, 2001, Oswald Beyer has noted that the Small Catechism’s explanation of the First Article does contain technical terminology characteristic of the medieval doctrine, in the language of merit and mercy. These references, however, are not further developed in the explanation of the Second Article, where a full treatment of justification by faith alone might be expected; Oswald Bayer, “Justification as the Basis and Boundary of Theology,” Lutheran Quarterly 15 (2001): 275–77.

12. The citations to the Small Catechism are from the version still most commonly in use in Lutheran parishes, The Small Catechism in Contemporary English (Minneapolis, Philadelphia and St. Louis: Augsburg, the Board of Publication of the Lutheran Church in America, and Concordia, 1968).


14. The most helpful discussion of Luther’s understanding of the relationship of the Commandments, the Creed and the Lord’s Prayer in the life of the believer is Herbert Girgensohn’s classic, Teaching Luther’s Catechism, trans. John Doberstein (Philadelphia: Muhlenberg, 1959), 3–5. The explanations of the Lord’s Prayer are clearly shaped by Luther’s theology of the cross even though, as with justification by faith in the Creed, there is no explicit reference. In both cases, his way of thinking theologically shapes the explanations without becoming the subject of them. The goal is not to inculcate ideology but to preach.

15. WA 39/1:352.


18. W. L. Morton, The Canadian Identity, 2nd ed. (Toronto: The University of Toronto Press, 1972). See also Charles Taylor, Radical Tories: The Conservative Tradition in Canada (Toronto: House of Anansi Press, 1982), 49–76. Paul Tillich, in his Systematic Theology (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), I, 174–176, describes individuation and participation together as an “ontological polarity,” an inherent tension of being. While both the United States and Canada have been shaped by a classically liberal tradition emphasizing the rights of the individual, Canada has retained an increasingly marginalized classical conservatism which has emphasized the priority of the community. Morton makes no reference to Tillich’s formulation of the polarity, his criticism reflects a traditional Canadian conservative apprehension that by tipping toward individuation by entitling the individual, a system of rights undermines the community. Both the positive and the negative impact of tipping the balance in this way is evident in American public life. While appeals to rights have served minorities and women facing communally imposed injustices, making the individual the ultimate standard reduces matters of law to personal preference or opinion, arbitrary values, and atomizes the community.

19. WA 39/1:358.
