Marcuse’s Critique of Luther’s Concept of Freedom

by Oswald Bayer

[Preceding this translation of Oswald Bayer’s 1969 lecture is his own 2017 reflection on the original context, namely, the tumultuous year 1968 with Marxist revolution and Freudian psychoanalysis in vogue.]

Preface (2017)

1968 was a fateful year in world history. Fifty years ago in May, the young generation, especially the students, took to the streets not only in San Francisco, Paris, and Berlin but across the western world. They held demonstrations, especially against the Vietnam War, under the slogan “Make love, not war!” The sexual revolution was combined with the desire to change the political world, as peacefully as possible, as at Woodstock (1969). The hope and intention was nothing less than a world revolution. Most saw this in purely Marxist terms; only a few saw evolution as the way to bring about the desired change rather than revolution. Especially in the Federal Republic of Germany, the student riots were connected with an uprising against the generation of the fathers, indeed, against authorities and institutions generally. It was not without reason that a more critical approach was taken to the National Socialist past and its latent presence in certain figures. A realignment, embracing the whole of society and politics, was promised by Marxism and psychoanalysis. This total realignment was to be not only intellectual but also radical, reaching to the very depths of subjectivity. Both Marxism and psychoanalysis were trusted as being true, with a religious fervor that we today can no longer understand. Both were supposed to offer an infallible conceptual tool with which to understand “the society” as an essential driving force of global history, to see what is going on in it and to transform it by emancipating it.

That the student movement also entered the realm of church and theology is not surprising, especially since the same Marxism that inspired the student movement with its teaching of hope and salvation also seemed to have an affinity with Jews and Christians. There was relentless pressure to adopt a critical stance towards the institution of the church and to pursue theology...
in the school of Feuerbach, Marx, and Freud, the masters of a hermeneutics of suspicion. In fact, the horizon of most theology in those days, largely oriented in a merely philological and historical direction and determined in a systematic-theological way by an existential interpretation that had no place for the world, was narrow to say the least. But these new authorities, the masters of that hermeneutics of suspicion, were often merely invoked and never thoroughly studied as they should have been in keeping with the academic tradition. So Marxism especially became an emotive word; it was present in the slogans on everyone’s lips, but when it came to a precise knowledge of the texts, it was conspicuous by its absence. Therefore, as a lecturer at that time at the Evangelisches Stift (college) in Tübingen, originally a monastery of the Augustinian Eremites and since 1536 a Lutheran seminary, I tried to teach the students to engage with Marxist thought also in an historical-critical way. At the same time, I wanted them to keep their minds open. These were the very students who expected nothing from theology, not even from Luther’s theology (“What’s with your late medieval monk? He’s hardly going to start a world revolution!”). I wanted them to be open to what theology is all about. I found myself at the border between theology and what called it into question, and it was here that I became aware that theology cannot be undertaken in a secluded ecclesiastical sphere, but must always engage with the hard questions addressed to the Christian faith or with the ideas that threaten to transform it. Therefore, it was during those years (1968–1971) that I came to understand that theology is basically a conflictual science or discipline, as I have shown in Theology the Lutheran Way (2007).

The conversation between theology and philosophy has been a centuries-long tradition in the Tübingen Stift and the lecture I gave there on 27 October 1969, entitled “Marcuse’s Critique of Luther’s Concept of Freedom,” is an example of precisely this sort of robust conversation and dispute between the disciplines. It is not by chance that this lecture focused on the notion of “freedom,” for this is a “concept of critical mediation” (see my Freedom in Response: Lutheran Ethics. Sources and Controversies, 2007, Introduction) which, probably better than any other, can trigger the conversation—and if necessary, the debate—between reformational thinking and modern thought.

Even after 50 years, the relevance and explosiveness of this issue of freedom has not changed in the least. On the contrary, the year 2017, which marked the commemoration of the 500th anniversary of the Reformation, as well as the decade leading up to it, showed that the concept of freedom still
plays a decisive role—if not the decisive role—for the self-understanding of Protestantism. For it seems to guarantee the identity and historical continuity of the Protestant churches and their theology like no other because it can bridge the gap between old and new Protestantism. However, this bridge-building is often bought at the expense of a conscious, but mostly unconscious, equivocation: as if the freedom of conscience purchased and won by Christ and continually bestowed by him is more or less identical with the modern freedom of religion and conscience! What is certainly true is that the latter has one of its roots in the former (for a broader context, see my “Necessary Transformation? The Reformation and Modernity in Controversy Over Freedom,” Pro Ecclesia, 22/3 [Summer 2012]: 290–306).

So we too in our day must inevitably face up to the problem of freedom—even though the way in which it is treated in the following translation of that 50-year-old German lecture is rather remote and unfamiliar to us in the twentieth-first century. In those days, the name of the German-American sociologist and philosopher, Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979), was on everyone’s lips; in fact, he was not only a popular leader but almost a cult figure, because he was virtually without peer in the way in which he was able to orient and represent, conceptually as well as rhetorically, the general emancipation of society, which was the object of people’s hopes and strivings. He did this by somehow combining the two main streams of influence, Marxism and psychoanalysis, into a single package, which was expected to be nothing less than the solution of the world’s problems. Many students, especially students of theology, found that Marcuse could articulate their concern, the re-creation of humankind, and relate it to the current situation better than traditional theology. According to his book Eros and Civilization (1955), paradise seemed to be almost in reach as the place where we enjoy labor, like a game, without the curse (Gen. 3:18f.) of alienation, where there are no longer any wars to fight, in short, where we can live happily in peace. At any rate, paradise seemed no longer to be a utopia. Consequently, Marcuse turned against Sigmund Freud’s reality principle, according to which human culture is always connected with a renunciation of desire, in the sense of one of the famous Parisian sayings of May 1968: “Soyez realistes, demandez l’impossible! Be realistic, demand the impossible!”

Basically, Marcuse followed the thesis defended by Karl Marx, with reference to Hegel, that from beginning to end man is a doer and a maker, and gains himself by means of self-creation through work, but essentially, he does
not live from a gift already given, and is his own creator, redeemer and con-
summator! The fact that Marxism today, fifty years after the May unrest of
1968, does not have the same political and intellectual significance as it did
then does not mean that it is a spent force and that we no longer need to
engage with it in debate. On the contrary, that fateful year has changed the
world permanently insofar as the “march through the institutions” begun at
that time by the generation in revolt brought with it many transformations;
but the fundamental conviction, that man is what he makes of himself, was
never questioned, but rather intensified and spilled over into other areas of
life. Marx and the Marxist tradition fundamentally misunderstand that man
is a created being. They fail to recognize the distinction between a preceding
divine promise and subsequent human faith and action; in other words:
the distinction between Sunday and workday. But this misunderstanding is
not confined to Marx and the tradition that followed him. Even after the
political downfall of real communist socialism, the orientation toward what
a person makes and can afford—the orientation to humans as producers
and consumers—continues to dominate almost the entire world. The political
downfall of real communist socialism by no means implies a weakening of
Marxist anthropology. Rather, it has remained decisive, even if more implic-
itly than explicitly, also in global liberal capitalism. The omnipotence and
ubiquity of wage justice as opposed to God’s unconditional goodness (Matt.
20:1–15) proves this.

Theology, and especially Lutheran theology, if it is to continue its critical
role in the specified sense, which is its task, cannot refrain from recognizing
the modern forms of wage and work justice, for example, “self-realization”
and “self-optimization,” in contradistinction to faith in the unconditional
goodness of God, which alone justifies. It is the task of theology to see to
it that the matter of wage and work justice is considered when perceiving
human beings and their social environment. Theology must also make the
necessary metacritical judgment in which an answer is given to the question
of whether and to what extent this concept of wage justice was promoted by
German Idealism, which Marx inherited. In any case, an analysis and dis-
cussion of Marcuse’s critique of Luther’s concept of freedom can promote, par-
adigmatically, the necessary metacritique of this idea of work justice. At the
same time, it can capture, clearly and sharply, the profile of Luther’s notion
of freedom, which he understands primarily as a categorical gift, as classically
described in his freedom tractate of 1520.
Marcuse’s Critique of Luther’s Concept of Freedom

Theology has become “the stabilizing complement of a capital-ist system where people are oppressed by the supraindividual forces inherent in the system.” This is the diagnosis of “Collective 17” that vicar Rolf Trommerhäuser presented to the second Celler Conference held in Bochum, Germany, March 17–20, 1969. What the church and theology needs to take notice of here is one of the most important insights of Critical Theory developed by the Frankfurt School in its reception of the work of Karl Marx. This insight has to be of interest to Protestant theologians, especially where the claim is made that it comes from documents that concern them directly. A case in point is a study by Herbert Marcuse first published in Paris in 1936 and then reissued in 1969. It originally came out in a volume of essays called Studien über Autorität und Familie, a research report put out by the Institute for Social Research, directed by Max Horkheimer. The first section of these essays, titled “Theoretical Perspectives,” had three parts: the first, written by Horkheimer, was “general”; the second, by Erich Fromm, was on “social psychology”; while the third, by Marcuse, was on the “history of ideas.”

Marcuse investigates here the relationship between autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and servitude in bourgeois philosophy, which he sees beginning with Luther. “The union of inner autonomy and outer heteronomy, the brokenness of inner freedom and unfreedom, is the decisive characteristic of the concept of freedom that has dominated bourgeois theory since the Reformation” (55). “In bourgeois philosophy . . . the autonomy of the person was placed at the very center of its theory: Kant’s teaching about freedom is only the clearest and highest expression of a tendency that has been evident since Luther’s treatise on the Freedom of a Christian” (55).

Marcuse’s whole essay traces the topic from “Luther and Calvin” through “Kant,” “Hegel,” the “counter-revolution and restoration” (de Maistre, Bonald, Burke—F. J. Stahl) to “Marx” and the “transformation of the bourgeois theory of authority into the theory of the totalitarian state” (Sorel, Pareto). The thesis of Marcuse’s essay, formulated by the propositions in the above paragraph, justifiably limits our attention to a discussion of the way in which Luther is presented in
Critical Theory. This limitation would amount to a distortion of the whole essay only if it fails to explain what it is that causes Marcuse to become interested in Luther in the first place. However, this must be discovered from his presentation of Luther as such.

In what follows, Marcuse’s critique of Luther’s concept of freedom, which can be summed up in a short double thesis, is first of all documented (I), then placed within the broader context of Critical Theory (II.1), analyzed from the angle of the history of ideas (II.2), and traced back especially to its archetype, which is to be found in Hegel (II.3). A metacritique is then employed (III) to distinguish Luther’s position from the distortions of his critics in order to find the best way to bring about a proper confrontation between Critical Theory and Reformation faith. This confrontation (IV) however can only take place at the most crucial point, and even here it can only be hinted at rather than executed.

I. Inner Freedom—Outer Unfreedom?

The priority of faith to action (more precisely, to good works), as maintained by Luther, is for Marcuse an inner a priori (66) that always comes before any praxis. He understands it as a determination resting in timeless ideality. “The Christian teaching about freedom pushes the liberation of human beings back until it pre-dates their actual history, which then, as the history of his unfreedom, is an ‘eternal’ consequence of this liberation” (56). In the second part of this quotation, the second aspect of Marcuse’s presentation of Luther is highlighted: that love, understood as a consequence of faith, means the “justification of the real unfreedom and inequality as a consequence of the ‘inner’ freedom” (59) so that “freedom is the condition of unfreedom” (56). “The recognition of the actual unfreedom (especially of the unfreedom caused by the distribution of property) is in fact part of the meaning of this concept of freedom” (65). “It is no coincidence that the essence of ‘Christian freedom,’ held out to the rebellious peasants, does not make them free but actually confirms their slavery” (65).

Faith, understood as a timeless determination, is unchangeable, a priori by nature, and irrevocable. Its counterpart is the unchangeability,
the irrevocability and the *a priori* nature of the world, in which faith works itself out in love. According to Marcuse, inner freedom and outer unfreedom in Luther exist, so to speak, in a pre-established harmony—so that the inner freedom causes the outer unfreedom and, conversely, outer unfreedom creates inner freedom as its necessary “complement” (60) for its own stabilization.8

It is in this sense that we must understand the conclusion of Marcuse’s presentation of Luther. Speaking of the two leading theses of Luther’s treatise on freedom, he says that they express “clearly and sharply the dualistic doctrine of the two realms, with freedom assigned entirely to the one, and unfreedom entirely to the other” (60).

II. Analysis

1. “Traditonal and Critical Theory”

In Luther, we first meet (admittedly in theological dress) that dualism which is the most characteristic mark of the modern bourgeois society. Its philosophical expression first appears in Descartes. The *res cogitans* (“Descartes’ ego cogito, Leibniz’s monad, Kant’s transcendental ego, Fichte’s subject of the original act”)9 means “the emancipated, self-referencing individual,”10 which exists alone in its “monadic isolation,”11 shut off from the outside world, “in contrast to its facticity,”12 the *res extensa*. This abstraction, “this radical withdrawal from the given,”13 mediates to the individual perfect freedom, but only an abstract inner freedom, a stoic “self-sufficiency,”14 which means a withdrawal of reason from real history, a reversion to isolated subjectivity.

The subject is rational only insofar as it is entirely self-sufficient. All that is “other” is alien and external to it and as such is at first suspect. For something to be true, it must be certain. For it to be certain, it must be posited by the subject as its own achievement. This holds equally for Descartes’ unshakeable foundation (*fundamentum inconcussum*) and Kant’s synthetic *a priori* judgments. Self-sufficiency and independence from all other, from all that is alien, is the sole guarantee also of the subject’s freedom. What is not dependent on any other person or thing, what is in full possession of itself, is free.15

“What reason is to accomplish is neither more nor less than the constitution of the world for the ego.”16 But even “this achievement
does not lead beyond what already exists. It changes nothing. For the constitution of the world is always achieved prior to the actual action of the individual. Thus, the individual can never take his most authentic achievement into his own hands.”17 This is the reason for the “inner stasis”18 of bourgeois philosophy, and philosophy generally, that Marcuse contrasts with Critical Theory. This comes out in the programmatic essay mentioned earlier, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (1937), which appeared in Zeitschrift für Sozialforschung shortly after Horkheimer’s work on “Traditional and Critical Theory,”19 which has become a “classic.” The two essays mutually explain each other.

“Theory in the traditional sense, established by Descartes and common among technical disciplines generally, organizes experience on the basis of issues that arise in connection with the reproduction of life within contemporary society,”20 “because the restriction of ‘productive’ cognition to the transcendental sphere makes any new form of the world impossible.”21 “The acceptance of the essential unchangeability of the relation between subject, theory, and object thus distinguishes the Cartesian conception from any kind of dialectical logic.”22 This eliminates the rigid dualism by insisting that inner freedom is realized only by the removal of outer unfreedom but that, conversely, the removal of outer unfreedom is nothing other than the realization of the inner freedom preserved in memory by theology and philosophy over against outer unfreedom.

From this perspective, philosophy cannot be praised highly enough by Critical Theory precisely because of the abstractness of its concept of freedom: “This abstractness saves its truth [that is, the truth of the bourgeois consciousness]; in fact, it makes it possible in the first place. It is only truth to the extent that it is not the truth about social reality.”23 To the extent that Critical Theory connects with the abstractness and boundlessness of the inner freedom and autonomy fostered by bourgeois society and philosophy despite the “authoritarian barbarity,”24 it “must concern itself to a hitherto unknown extent with the past—precisely insofar as it is concerned with the future.”25 As he looked back to the essays he wrote between 1934 and 1938, Marcuse could say in 196426 that “it was spirit, reason, conscience, and ‘pure’ thought that in traditional culture was said
to constitute the autonomy of the subject, the essential freedom of
the human being. This was the sphere of negation, opposition to
the existing order, refusal, dissociation and criticism. Protestantism
and the bourgeois revolutions proclaimed freedom of thought and
freedom of conscience; they were the forms of dissent that were
sanctioned—often the only and most treasured refuge of hope.”

This is nothing more than a brief sketch to highlight the essential
features of Critical Theory in its relation to the traditional theory of
bourgeois philosophy in order to set Marcuse’s critique of Luther’s
concept of freedom in its broad context. After having started with
the critique of the origin of bourgeois philosophy and arriving at
the broad context of Critical Theory, let us now retrace our steps,
so to speak, and try to identify the transitions and shifts, beyond
those that Marcuse found in his thesis, by analyzing his critique
of Luther’s concept of freedom from the angle of the history of
ideas. This should provide us with helpful criteria to guide us in our
metacriticism.

2. Transformations of Hegelian and Marxian Themes

By taking the view that Luther advocates an “unfreedom condi-
tioned by the internalization of freedom” (66), Marcuse raises the
same objection against him as the young Marx raises against Hegel.27
Marx’s main objection to the tenor of Hegel’s thought, especially in
the *Phenomenology of Spirit*, is that Hegel, despite all the mutual pen-
etration and interweaving of the rational and the real, the real and
the rational, abstracts from the reality implicit in “*sensuous* human
activity, practice,”28 and by doing so confirms precisely the exist-
ing order. Marx shows29 that this “thinking sublation . . . leaves its
object standing unchanged in reality.”30 This is Hegel’s lie; it is not
an opportunistic accommodation to circumstances but “the lie of
his principle.”31

However, the Marxian critique of Hegelian philosophy does
not exclude but in fact includes its reception: “The outstanding
achievement of Hegel’s *Phenomenology* and its final result—the
dialectic of negativity as the motive and productive principle—is that
Hegel conceives the self-creation of man to be a process, objecti-
fication to be a deobjectification, an exinanition and a sublation of
this examination. In other words, Hegel’s crowning achievement and final outcome is that he grasps the essence of labor and understands that objective man, who is true man because he is real, is the result of his own labor.”

What Marx praises in Hegel under the rubric of “labor,” Hegel praises in Luther under the rubric of “appropriation.” The reformational turn from the Catholic Mass to the Protestant Lord’s Supper, “in which all is concentrated,” is grounded in the fact “that the subject receives the divine element into himself—but that it is divine only in so far as it is consumed in faith, and by believing it and consuming it, it ceases to be an external thing.” In other words, for Hegel the host is divine only in so far as the host, as an object, ceases to be an object because it is appropriated (angeeignet).

“The subjectivity now makes the objective content . . . its own,” in order “to accomplish the work of reconciliation in itself.”

Marx again shares this Hegelian view of the Reformation. Whereas, according to Luther, the word is external and precedes faith, so that faith is a gift, the Hegelian view completely reverses this so that faith is no longer something given (zugeeignet) from the outside but is appropriated by the self from within (aneignend). Therefore, he holds that Luther “liberated man from external religiosity by making religiosity the inner man.” While this is not “the true solution,” it is at least “a true statement of the problem”; it refers back to Hegel’s judgment that “it was with Luther first of all that freedom of spirit began to exist in embryo . . . The explication of this freedom and the self-reflective grasp of it was a subsequent step . . .” Marx, untroubled by the problem first sharply raised by Troeltsch, of “where the Reformation fits in the history of ideas,” also acknowledges the “progress in the consciousness of freedom” that came about as a result of the Reformation. For he sees in Luther’s theology the origin of bourgeois philosophy; here he follows not only Hegel but also the canon of the Marxist historiography of the Reformation established by Engels. Accordingly, he sees realized in Luther’s concept of freedom the “release from old authorities” and describes “its anti-authoritarian tendency” as “a very important element in the Christian-bourgeois doctrine of freedom.” Yet he hardly makes anything of it, despite its importance for
Hegel and Marx, but stresses almost exclusively that the release from old authorities is followed by the imposition of new authorities and introduces that pre-established harmony between inner freedom and outer unfreedom. For this he appeals to Marx’s judgment that “Luther, without question, overcame the notion of servitude based on devotion, but only by replacing it with servitude based on conviction” (66).43 We observe therefore that Marcuse does not follow the line that Hegel sees running from Luther to himself and that, as we said, is of fundamental importance also for Marx when it comes to the idea of labor. He does not emphasize the appropriation, which in faith transcends “the external thing,” as Hegel maintains, but the element of priority, which for Luther lies in the fact that God and his Word come before faith and that, correspondingly, faith comes before action. But he understands this transcendentally as an eternal inner principle, in the sense of a Kantian postulate of practical reason,44 in order then to have to stress that this kind of freedom can “never be the result of an action” (61), like Marxian freedom. This corresponds exactly to Hegel’s critique of Kant.45

We can now summarize the results of our analysis of the implications of Marcuse’s presentation of Luther from the standpoint of the history of ideas. Two main elements of Luther’s theology in their secularized form are separated from each other and played off against each other. The element of priority appears in a simple refraction: as a Kantian a priori. The element of appropriation, which, according to Marcuse, is contrary to this element of priority, appears in its second refraction: Hegel had to allow the bestowal (Zueignung) to be swallowed up by the appropriation (Aneignung) (and this moreover, in a radically expanded form, becomes the general movement).46 Marx perceived this mental appropriation to be a sensuous activity.

In this refraction, an important element of Luther’s theology in Marcuse, which has become his sole argument, is turned against Luther himself.

3. Hegel’s Critique of Stoicism and Marx’s Critique of Hegel

Before we conclude our analysis and try, by means of a metacritique, to differentiate Luther’s position from the way in which he is presented by Marcuse, we want again to draw attention to the point at
which Critical Theory differs from philosophy. This point is difficult to determine in the case of Marx’s relation to Hegel because of the conflicting elements especially in Hegel’s philosophy. For what Marx criticizes in Hegel, that “the thinking sublation . . . leaves its object standing unchanged in reality,”47 Hegel himself has already anticipated in his Phenomenology of Spirit with his critique of Stoicism.48 Critical Theory followed this critique in its treatment of bourgeois philosophy,49 Luther included. Marcuse speaks of a “self-sufficient inner freedom” (60) that Luther champions with his understanding of faith. So, Marcuse’s connections with the history of philosophy, which are the context of his critique of Luther, should be clear as we now briefly rehearse Hegel’s decisive statements on Stoicism, which he discusses in connection with his presentation of the “freedom of self-consciousness.”50

Freedom in thought has only pure thought as its truth, a truth that lacks the fullness of life. Therefore, it too is only the notion of freedom, not the living reality of freedom itself. For the essence of freedom is only thinking in general, the form [of thought] as such, which has turned away from the independence of things and returned into itself.31 This thinking consciousness, in the way in which it is thus constituted, as abstract freedom, is therefore only the incomplete negation of otherness. Withdrawn from existence solely into itself, it has not there fully vindicated itself as the absolute negation of this existence.52

Thetically, at least, there has to be a pointer in the section on Stoicism to the preceding section on “lordship and bondage”53 and to the immediately following section on “Skepticism”: Just as “Stoicism corresponds to the notion of the independent consciousness, which appeared as the master and slave relationship, so Skepticism corresponds to its realization as a negative attitude to otherness, desire and work.”54 “The skeptical self-consciousness thus experiences, in the flux of all that would secure itself, its own freedom as given and preserved by itself; it is itself this stoical indifference (ataraxia) of a thinking that thinks itself, the unchangeable and genuine certainty of itself.”55

And the overall context of Hegel’s presentation of the “freedom of self-consciousness,” in which the above sentences are found, can be summarized as follows. “In Stoicism, self-consciousness is the simple freedom of itself. In Scepticism, it realizes itself, negates the other side of determinate existence (Dasein), but really duplicates itself, and now knows itself to be a duality. Consequently, the duplication, which was formerly divided between two individuals, the master and the slave, has now returned to one. The duplication of
self-consciousness within itself, which is essential to the notion of Spirit, is therefore at hand, but not yet in its unity: the *unhappy consciousness* is the consciousness of self as a dual-natured, but contradictory being.”

With Hegel’s critique of Stoicism within the overall context of his presentation of the “freedom of self-consciousness,” we have before us the archetype of the picture given to us by Marcuse in his critique of Luther.

**III. Metacriticism**

The metacritique of Marcuse’s critique of Luther can go in two ways, corresponding to the double structure of the correlation into which Marcuse’s presentation above (I) was compressed.

1. **A Priori or Promised Freedom?**

The priority of faith to works is for Marcuse an “‘inner’ *a priori*” (66) that resides in a timeless intelligible world. For Luther, on the other hand, the priority of faith is not always present for us to call on, say, in defining human existence (as if faith was founded on a human ability or need!). Rather, it arises first and only from a particular word that encounters us in time, concretely, as an oral and public word and that refers to an event in time, to what took place under Pontius Pilate.

Such faith is produced and preserved when we are told why Christ came, and how we are to use and enjoy what he has brought and given us. This happens when the Christian freedom he gives us is rightly taught and we are told how we Christians are all kings and priests and have power over everything and can firmly believe that everything we do is now pleasing to God.

“Freedom” then is not the transcendental postulate of practical reason that gives meaning to life, and which must always be presupposed, but the liberation “of human beings from the immaturity of their self-inflicted slavery” which comes about only through the concrete word of absolution and consolation. This liberation frees
them to be God’s sons and heirs who, in praying to the Father, leave behind the spirit of slavery and fear, and boldly utter the “cry of freedom” in public, without being afraid of the powers (Rom. 8). To that extent we cannot agree with Marcuse that “the Christian teaching about freedom pushes the liberation of human beings back until it pre-dates their actual history . . . “ (56). For this would be true only if we developed the teaching about the predestination to freedom in a speculative way, made it an a priori, and thought of it as timeless, or if we defined the time and history of human beings solely as their own “action and thinking,” as does Marcuse (66), and considered that what enables and determines this action and thinking is again only the action and thinking of humans (other humans) in the sense of a “self-constitution.” That of course would rule out a “creation” as Marx himself emphasizes.

The picture of a stasis that Marcuse claims to find in Luther’s concept of freedom obscures not only the concrete place in time where, for Luther, we find freedom, but also the fact that this freedom is contested and can be lost. Therefore, it must be continually regained, ever anew, from outside, in the word of absolution that contradicts our experience, and not in the remembered perception of an inner call, but, at the same time, neither is it to be gained anew in moral action. Insofar as freedom can be lost in the world and in society, we cannot assume that for Luther the social order “is not by any means the realm where a decision is made about the existence or non-existence of human beings” (57). The freedom promised to Christians and so constitutive for them is effective and necessary precisely in their calling, in their work—but it is certainly not to be gained only from it, as is the case for Hegel and Marx, for whom it is only in the result that the subject achieves its essence and human beings realize themselves.

2. Freedom Without Consequences?

If the freedom and sovereignty of faith is not something static, then it is doubtful whether the stasis of “outer unfreedom,” which Marcuse attributed to Luther’s understanding of the servitude of love—in strict correspondence to the stasis of “inner freedom”—is what Luther
actually intended, or whether—since it can undoubtedly be found in the history of Lutheranism—it is a necessary part of his understanding of freedom. In other words, it is doubtful whether a “justification of actual unfreedom and inequality” must be understood as a necessary “consequence of ‘inner’ freedom and equality” (59).

The first thing, of course, that must be considered here is the following difficulty. No one will dispute that when we study history and the ways in which we respond to a challenging phenomenon, in this case, Luther’s theology of freedom, we also take into account, either consciously or unconsciously, the “responses” that others have given to this phenomenon in the past. On the other hand, we will only be able to critically assess these responses by going back to the original testimony of the phenomenon. For how else are we to establish whether, or even in what respect, Philip Melanchthon or Thomas Müntzer is the “legitimate” custodian of Luther’s legacy? And yet, essential as it is to go back to the sources, that has its own problems. Where do we even find the phenomenon in question? Where is Luther’s theology of freedom articulated and attested? In the freedom tractate of 1520? At Worms before the emperor and the empire? Only before the Peasants’ War? Also during the Peasants’ War? Also after the Peasants’ War? (At any rate, according to Marxist historiography, “we would not even begin to understand the Reformation without the fact of the Peasants’ War.”)? Only in the Preface to the “German Mass”? Or also after the electoral visitation and with the emergence of church government by the territorial prince?

If we take the view that it was Müntzer who completed Luther’s original theology of freedom, then we have to say that Luther’s own development shows signs of increasing hardening or even a departure from his original intentions and that he simply became the “princes’ lackey.” “Luther, as the ideologue of the bourgeois reform, had subordinated the new faith and the new church to the authority of the secular powers, while Müntzer, as the ideologue of the peasant-plebian masses, associated the religious idea of the freedom of the Christian with the political idea of total freedom from all existing powers.”

If we avoid premature partiality, the historical view will at first be aware of only the complexity and multifacetedness of the phenomenon. Admittedly, for Marcuse it is clear: the freedom proclaimed
by the church causes and perpetuates the unfreedom of society; it interprets the existing state of affairs without changing it.

Someone may now contradict Marcuse and assert that Luther did not simply interpret the existing state of affairs but changed it—in a way that had implications for world history. The radical change originated from the center of his theology, his sacramental teaching. The rediscovery of the power of baptism resulted in a new view of *vocation*, which, like the new understanding of the Lord's Supper, profoundly changed, among other things, also the economic situation. Since Luther, to use Marx's apt words, "changed priests into laypeople because he changed laypeople into priests," he did not begin, contra Marx and Marcuse, a "theoretical revolution" but brought about a change that also has sociological implications. It seems strange that Marcuse can accept, admittedly only incidentally, Max Weber's thesis concerning the inner-worldly asceticism of Protestantism, which posits that there is at least a connection, if not an identity, between religious action and social action; at the very least, it says that religious action is also social action (58). Yet, on the other hand, Marcuse claims that Luther tears faith and love apart, despite the Reformer's emphasis on their close connection. Marcuse maintains that faith has no significance for love, or its function is such that it does nothing to change the conditions in which love operates.

This argument, where theological and sociological aspects overlap, is indispensable because it pinpoints exactly the crux of the controversy. But it will not help us reach a verdict, since, according to Marcuse, it only shifts the focus of the controversy to the question of the rights and limits of bourgeois society. He recognizes the change that Luther brought about, but argues that it brings with it an ever greater unfreedom. Therefore, he can no longer speak of "change" (in a positive sense) but must rather speak of the "justification of actual unfreedom and inequality as a consequence of the 'inner' freedom and equality" (59). Secondly, theologians also cannot expect a decision in the dispute about a theology from the argument in question, if they want to avoid the practical syllogism (*syllogismus practicus*). So, despite any lingering doubts, there is only one way to proceed, and that is to stick to the *texts* Marcuse refers to in making
his judgment. But if we are going to do justice to them, we will have to contradict Marcuse’s interpretation of Luther.

Luther makes a major point of emphasizing the dialectic of faith (lordship) and love (servanthood) in the two key theses of the freedom tractate. Marcuse however destroys this dialectic by identifying the works that are conquered and excluded by faith with the servitude of love. For Luther, these works are “dead” while for Marcuse they are the embodiment of vitality and salvation. Marcuse is wrong in identifying these works with the servitude of love, for love, according to Luther, is highly spontaneous, alive, and creative by virtue of faith.

Furthermore, it is completely consistent with this identification when Marcuse ignores the fact that for Luther the servanthood of love is only a servanthood on the part of the one who loves, not on the part of the one who is loved, for whom this servanthood brings freedom. In Luther’s sense, it is necessary to stress, contra Marcuse, that the servanthood of love is characterized by “freedom,” both in view of its origin, faith, and its goal, the works of love. Only by the passage and transition from one to the other is love understood as servanthood, as “self-emptying” (Phil. 2:7), where the one becomes a Christ to the other.

The free person works as a servant. This clearly is the necessary consequence of this passage and transition. But just because work is not necessary for salvation and so is not driven by a performance principle, does not justify the conclusion that it is arbitrary and purely a matter of choice, as Marcuse thinks when he refers to Luther’s idea of work as “what man is free to do here, what can be done or not done” (60). As if faith could ever abandon love! Faith does not have to first choose love, but the believer simply loves. As Luther says, “faith goes to work with vim and vigor” (Gal. 5:6). This is how Christians change the world: their own unredeemed body and the need of the neighbor—“considering nothing except the need and the benefit of the neighbor.” The struggle against this need and the overcoming of it are not interiorized in the constant return to and reflexion on the pure disposition of “the autonomously acting person” (61). On the contrary, it is just through the freedom of faith that Christians are enabled to empty themselves in history and work
for its progress: “we begin to make some progress in what will be perfected in the future life.” Marcuse confuses the Christian faith with Stoic autarky and Kantian autonomy. Against this confusion, it must be said that faith, by definition, is not itself sufficient, but relies on God, and he is not a worldless God but claims the godless world as his creation. According to this claim, the believer becomes absorbed into the world to manage and transform it. So the Christian cannot be content, as Hegel says of the Stoic, simply “to be free, whether on the throne or in chains, in the utter dependence of his individual existence, and to maintain that lifeless indifference that constantly withdraws from the bustle of existence, from activity as well as passivity, into the simple essentiality of thought.” He does not live as “the man who is enclosed in his inner freedom”—as Marcuse interprets it (60)—but “spends himself and all he has”; “he lives only for others and not for himself.”

3. Externality—Self-Emptying

Luther briefly summarizes his understanding of the Freedom of a Christian at the end of his tractate in the following thesis. “We conclude, therefore, that a Christian lives not in himself, but in Christ and in his neighbor. He lives in Christ through faith, in his neighbor through love.” In the context of the tractate and of Luther’s theology as a whole, this means: Christians are certain of the freedom that characterizes their faith, not through autonomous inwardness, but they learn it from an external, oral word that asserts itself in public disputes. Only through this word does it extend further to “change and renew the whole world.” It is grounded “in Christ,” in an event that took place sub Pontio Pilato, and does not presuppose—like the philosophy that Marcuse sees set out in Luther and that he contrasted with Critical Theory—an “eternal consciousness that transcendentally constitutes the individual consciousness of historical subjects.” (Admittedly, Luther’s own terminology, which speaks of the “inner” man on the basis of ancient traditions, can easily foster the misunderstanding we find in Marcuse. For that reason, it is by no means adequate for describing the situation.)

Corresponding to the external foundation of faith, love is directed outwards, to the needs of the world and the overcoming of them.
The Christian lives in this love, “not in himself, but in . . . his neighbor,” by caring for the neighbor in the real world. Love cannot recognize itself in the disposition of an autonomous individual who lives in himself alone. For in love, Christians use the freedom they are given by Christ in the word for the very purpose of forgetting themselves in work and emptying themselves into history.

Broadly speaking, Luther’s concern is to distinguish between faith and love (or to use those dubious terms, the “inner” and the “outer” man), but not to create a dualistic separation between an inner freedom and an outer unfreedom, where each is secure in itself and supportive of the other. Rather, faith and love are connected and interact to such an extent that there could never be an end to the dialectic of lordship and servanthood as formulated in the two key propositions of the freedom tractate. Luther’s patriarchal lifeworld, firmly established with its three “orders,” is significantly relativized by his preaching of freedom and therefore cannot hinder the transforming power of this preaching “for all people on earth.”

The following however must be noted. If we are emphasizing here, in contradiction to Marcuse, the dynamic in Luther’s concept of freedom, then this does not mean that this is to be understood “purely historically” in such a way that faith and its ground are a mere possibility, which is only realized in love. With that we have touched the point at which Critical Theory and Reformation faith part ways.

**IV. The True Being of Humans: Faith and Love**

We saw that we can only do justice to Luther’s concept of freedom if we correct the misunderstanding of it in Marcuse. His false picture of it comes from Critical Theory, which derived it from bourgeois society and its philosophical dualism, which goes back to Descartes, and then projected it back on to Luther. For interpretative terms, such as “dualism” (60), “absolute isolation and atomization” (67) of the “individual,” his “private independence of authority” (68), “self-sufficient inner freedom” (60), “inner, a priori” (66), “autonomously acting person” (61) are absolutely unsuitable in any presentation of his theology. In contrast to the dominant picture
conveyed by these terms, we have pointed to the public character and the transforming power of Luther's preaching of freedom. This does not mean, as we have already indicated, that we want to restyle Luther from being the main representative of early bourgeois society to being a representative of Critical Theory. Marcuse's criticism, however, has challenged us to emphasize those aspects of his concept of freedom that Neo-Protestantism has largely glossed over or distorted by filtering it through improper grids, especially that of Neo-Kantianism.95

From this we can conclude that theology generally would benefit from a careful consideration of Critical Theory,96 for this would draw its attention to aberrations or at least encourage it to be alert to such or possibly even remind it of aspects of the faith that Critical Theory has managed to preserve better than theology and the church.97 But an uncritical friendship with it would, of course, be fatal for theology. Rather, both must confront each other at the critical point. Finally, then, we must point out, even if only briefly, where praxis in the sense of Critical Theory, as advocated by Marcuse, differs from the life of a “Christian.”98

Marcuse, in his critique of Luther, where he briefly outlines his own position, says that “the freedom or unfreedom of man is decided on earth itself, in social praxis, and man is, in the most dangerous sense of the word, free from God and can become free to himself” (65). It is difficult to decide whether we are to understand this in an existential-ontological way or in a Marxist sense, and so to decide where exactly Marcuse located himself on his journey from Heidegger to Marx, which he had set out on in 1928 with his attempt to write a “Phenomenology of Historical Materialism,”99 which is inherently self-contradictory.100 At any rate, since he is speaking of humans who are “free,” Marcuse is speaking only of their origin, and so of what they not yet are, but are potentially already, and he is speaking of their future, the realization of this possibility, but he is not speaking of their present state. He identifies—in the language of Hegel used by Marx in his “Parison Manuscript,”101 first published in 1932 and immediately taken up with great interest by Marcuse who appreciated its significance—the essence of human beings and does not describe their present existence.102 This appears
in Marx rather under the headings “exinanition,” “alienation,” and “unfreedom.”

“Freedom” in this context is therefore only the terminus a quo and ad quem, without which the process that Marx calls prehistory cannot be articulated at all. The two termini, the protological and the eschatological, so to speak, are in fact determinations of the process itself and, potentially, lie within it. They do not exist apart from it; neither do they hover outside, behind, or over it. But for the present, they are hidden under their opposite, which qualifies this ontically. We can speak of “free” human beings only ontologically. They are present only in their distortion; the only thing that exists in flesh and blood are unfree humans, humans in their estrangement.

At the time of writing his critique of Luther, Marcuse is certain that Critical Theory can achieve “its goals only from present tendencies of the social process.” Here he sticks closely to the thinking of Marx who discerns the real possibility of liberation in the analysis of the existing relations of production in order to achieve the realization of this possibility in a concrete, definite negation. However, Marcuse moves away from this idea more and more and finally settles on an “apotheosis of negation” in the sense of the abstract, pure negation of the “great refusal” in the One-Dimensional Man. Here Marcuse abandons Marx to such an extent that he can only think in the figure of the “petitio principii,” according to which “freedom is a necessary a priori of liberation”—which seems to contradict the sentence of his Luther critique “that the freedom or unfreedom of man is decided . . . in social praxis.” This apotheosis of negation, which is determinative of the late work of Marcuse, was heavily criticized by Marxist orthodoxy because it seemed to be related to Dialectical Theology and to Kierkegaard’s “qualitative dialectic.” We only have to consider it here insofar as it expresses a resignation that corresponds directly to that ontology of self-liberation and self-realization that guides Marcuse’s critique of Luther’s concept of freedom.

Over against this resignation, Luther’s distinction between faith and love, which permits no cessation of the dialectic, gains a new actuality. This reference to Luther, of course, does not mean that we are again genuinely promoting the dialectic of Hegel and Marx
against Marcuse. For that would amount to overestimating the difference between Luther and Marcuse at the expense of the no less significant difference between Luther, on the one hand, and Hegel and Marx, on the other.

For Luther, the “free” human being does not only exist ontologically. Rather, Christians are concretely free and new persons because the word of Christ, which creates and preserves their freedom, was and is an effective word and therefore a concrete power and not just a parole, born of necessity, that only realizes itself in revolutionary praxis and so only becoming a reality in human work. If the latter were what is meant by Christian freedom, it could lead to complete resignation. Here we see the unbridgeable difference between Luther and his critic. For Marcuse, nothing else is possible or real besides thinking and acting: *tertium non datur!* Luther’s theology, on the other hand, is grounded in the concrete, oral, and public event of word and faith, which is in no way separated from thinking and acting, and yet is to be distinguished from them—because of God’s honor, that is, his power as creator and judge, and because of human thinking and acting. For this is not robbed of its dignity by faith but is liberated for concrete action and particular work, because believers no longer have to accomplish everything through their work; in a word, they no longer have to achieve their own salvation.

The crucial presupposition in Marcuse’s critical presentation of Luther’s concept of freedom is that it does not recognize the independence of the third factor mentioned above and immediately shifts word and faith into the realm of (traditional) theory. That, of course, leads inescapably to the statement: “The true human subject is never the subject of *praxis*” (61); “the person as such essentially never enters into (his) work” (61). This means that Marcuse can no longer understand that for Luther the person always enters completely into his work but is not the result of his work; he loses himself in his work but does not gain himself in it.

“The true being of a man is his . . . deed; in this the individual is actual . . .” This sentence of Hegel is also the premise of Marx and, in spite of the difference between Marx and Marcuse, guides Marcuse’s critique of Luther’s concept of freedom. This amounts to a fundamental reassertion in the modern era of the binding nature of
the Aristotelian anthropology that Luther had passionately opposed in his struggle against the works-righteousness of his day. If this anthropology, which with its mainly plausible recognition of the historical and social character of so much of what in Luther’s time was still regarded as “nature,” had gained the unanimous acceptance of Christian theology, it would have destroyed it. If theology, as a function of the church, is to ensure that the church can continue to speak its own word, then one of its most urgent tasks must be to take up the topic of “possibility and actuality” in order to engage with the universal claim of the Aristotelian philosophy of motion, renewed by Hegel and Marx, to be the self-realization of the world. The claim of this philosophy must be critically considered and relativized by theology.

—For Bettina, my daughter, born 28 April 1968—


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NOTES


6. Compare the beginning of Marcuse’s presentation of Luther: “Luther’s pamphlet Freedom of a Christian brought together for the first time all the elements which constitute the specifically bourgeois concept of freedom and which became the ideological basis for the specifically bourgeois articulation of authority. . . .” (56) with the introductory sentence of his presentation of Kant: “The inner connections between Lutheran and Kantian ethics are plainly apparent” (79) and the respective characteristics that then follow. On the whole, Hegel’s critique of Kant and Fichte is here projected back onto Luther (see Marcuse, Reason and Revolution, [see above note 5], 47) (see below note 45).

7. “Consequence” here does not suggest an irreversible relation. It is the consequence of an “ideological basis” (56), which of course is not a basis as such, but for its part again must be seen as the complement to an external order. This complement does not precede the order but is first created by it with a quite definite intention (in no way reflected subjectively!) and so at least exists together with it: “However, this anti-authoritarian tendency (specifically ‘the liberation of the conscience from numerous religious and ethical norms’) is only the complement of an order that is directly linked to the way that deeply ambivalent authority relationships function. From the very outset, the bourgeois concept of freedom left the way open for the recognition of certain metaphysical authorities and this recognition is meant to perpetuate outer unfreedom within the human soul” (54). On the question about the interaction between society and religion and religion and society, compare Horkheimer, “Authority and the Family” (see above note 4), 63–64.
8. How compatible are the dissonances, spoken of on pp. 54 and 55 (“the reproduction of the whole society is only possible at the price of continual crises,” 54), with this almost rigid necessity where, according to Marcuse, inner freedom and outer unfreedom are tied together? The lack of clarity found here can be seen especially in the concluding sentence of the “introduction” to the whole study (55): “The antagonisms appear in the most varied forms in the ambivalence of bourgeois authority relationships: they are rational and yet coincidental, objective and yet anarchistic, necessary and yet bad.”

9. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 5), 139. For a development of this summary, see Horkheimer, “Authority and Family” in Critical Theory, 72–78 (the dualism of the bourgeois society is then demonstrated from the independent employer [79–83] and from the worker [83–87]). The main features of Marcuse’s “Philosophy and Critical Theory” appear again in the transition from the first to the second part of Reason and Revolution (251–257: “From Philosophy to Social Theory”). The final part of “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (on the power of “imagination,” 154–155) prepares for the claim made by the students during the Paris riots of May 1968, “All power to the imagination!”

10. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 5), 150.

11. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 151. Compare Horkheimer, “Egoism and the Freedom Movement” (see above note 5), 49: “If the characteristic philosophy of the age understands man as a self-contained monad in transcendental solitude, connected with every other monad only by complicated mechanisms deprived of their will, then bourgeois man’s form of existence appears here in metaphysical terms. Each one is the center of the world, and everyone else is ‘outside.’ All communication is an exchange, a transaction between solipsistically constructed realms.” (trans. alt.)

12. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 150. Compare this with his presentation of Luther: the “ways of defining inner freedom are given in a counter-attack on external freedom, as negations of a merely external state of freedom” (56) (trans. alt.); “the autonomously acting person” is “sought in contradistinction to his (‘dead’) works: as the negation and negativity of the works” (61) (trans. alt.).


14. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 41; see Marcuse’s presentation of Luther (57) and below II.3.


19. In Critical Theory (see above note 4), 188–243. That this work achieved the status of a “classic” contradicts both its self-understanding and its understanding of time.

20. M. Horkheimer, in “postscript” to “Traditional and Critical Theory” in Critical Theory (see above note 4), 244 (emphasis mine).


22. M. Horkheimer, “Traditional and Critical Theory” (see above note 4), 211 (trans. alt.).

23. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 5), 152 (trans. alt.)


26. H. Marcuse, Foreword to Kultur und Gesellschaft (see above note 5), 8.

27. Compare with the text from Marx cited below in note 76.


31. K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (see above note 29), 149.

32. K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844, 140 (trans. alt.). Marcuse has pointed out Hegel’s significance for Marx at this point, especially: “Neue Quellen zur Grundlegung des Historischen Materialismus” (Die Gesellschaft IX, 1932, 136–174; reprinted in Ideen zu einer kritischen Theorie der Gesellschaft [see above note 3], 7–54). See Reason and Revolution (see above note 3), 259.


34. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy, vol. 3: Medieval and Modern Philosophy, trans. E. S. Haldane and Frances H. Simson (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1974), 54 (trans. alt.). See also p. 150: “This is the great principle [of the Reformation]—that all externality disappears at the point of the absolute relationship to God; and along with this externality, this self-alienation, all servitude has also disappeared” (trans. alt.).

35. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of History (see above note 33), 416 (trans. alt.).


37. Karl Marx: Selected Writings, 68.

38. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the History of Philosophy (see above note 34), 148.


41. G.W.F. Hegel, Lectures on the Philosophy of World History. Introduction: Reason in History, trans. H. B. Nisbet from the German edition of Johannes Hoffmeister (London: Cambridge University Press, 1975), 54. “This is the essence of the Reformation: Man in his very nature destined to be free” (Lectures on the Philosophy of History [see above note 33], 417). What Marcuse objects to here is the confusion between the idea and reality: “Hegel’s picture of the Reformation is just as erroneous as his description of the subsequent social development, because he confused the ideas by which modern society glorified its rise with the reality of this society” (Reason and Revolution [see above note 5], 245–246, trans. alt.).
42. On the link between the Reformation and bourgeois society, see *Reason and Revolution*, besides 14f. esp. 3, 86, 243f. Friedrich Engels borrowed from Hegel via Marx (“Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction” [see above note 36], 68) the idea that Luther was an ideologist of the bourgeois society. See his 1850 publication on the peasants’ revolt, translated as *The Peasant War in Germany* (New York: International Publishers, 1926). From here on it belonged inalienably to Marxist historiography, a view of history shared also by Roy Pascal (*The Social Basis of the German Reformation*, London: Watts, 1933) as noted by Marcuse (p. 63, note 17). [Translator’s note: The 1848 uprisings in Germany reminded Engels of the last great peasant rebellions of the 1500s. As he would later write: “The parallel between the German Revolution of 1525 and that of 1848–49 was too obvious to be altogether ignored at that time.” *The Peasant War in Germany* was the first history book to assert that the real motivating force behind the Reformation and 16th century peasant war was socio-economic (class conflict) rather than “merely” religious.]


44. H. Marcuse draws an immediate parallel between the “realm of reason” and the “realm of God” (52). See p. 56 where faith in the sense of Luther’s freedom tractate is taken as being “private autonomy and reason.”

45. See Marcuse’s presentation of this critique in *Reason and Revolution* (see above note 5), 47: “The ‘realm of freedom,’ which is the inherent goal of reason, cannot be achieved by playing off the subject against the objective world, as Kant and Fichte thought, attributing to the autonomous person all the freedom that is lacking in the external world, and leaving the latter a domain of blind necessity. (Hegel finds here the important mechanism of ‘internalization’ or introversion by which philosophy and literature generally have made liberty into an inner value to be realized within the soul alone.)” (trans. alt.) See J. Derbolav, “Hegels Theorie der Handlung,” *Hegelstudien* 3 [1965], 210.

46. Paul Hacker, in *Das Ich im Glauben bei Martin Luther* (Graz: Styria, 1966), attributed to Luther the view that first appeared in Hegel: that faith is related to God “in such a way that it takes hold of God and appropriates him reflexively” (236). Even though Hacker is wrong about Luther, his work still can help us indirectly to recognize more sharply the problems involved in Hegel’s appeal to Luther. Hans Joachim Iwand’s polemic, “Wider den Missbrauch des ‘pro me’ als methodisches Prinzip in der Theologie” (*Evangelische Theologie* 14 [1954]: 120–124 = ThLZ 79 [1954]: 453–458) would have to be renewed today, not so much because of Kant’s sphere of influence, as because of the influence of Hegel and Marx and their understanding of appropriation, which swallows up the bestowal.

47. See above, note 30.

48. We note that Marcuse describes Hegel’s presentation of stoicism as a “play of conflicting elements in his philosophy” in *Reason and Revolution* (see above note 5), 118–120 (citation 119). Compare *Reason and Revolution*, 156–157 and “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 5), 141, especially note 7, where Marcuse notes Hegel’s view that although philosophy’s task is to reconcile antitheses in reason, it provides “reconciliation not in reality, but in the world of ideas.”

49. See, for example, H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory,” 138, 140f.


abstract (Ideelos) sophistical understanding, which can so distinguish body and soul as to hold that the ‘thing-in-itself’ (Ding an sich), the soul, is not touched or attacked if the body is maltreated and the existent embodiment of personality (Existenz der Person) is subjected to the power of another. Marcuse sees in this a citation of Luther’s Freedom of a Christian (Reason and Revolution, 199).

52. G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 122.
54. G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 123 (trans. alt.).
55. G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 124 (trans. alt.).
56. G.W.F Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit, 126 (trans. alt.).

58. Martin Luther, Freedom of a Christian, WA 7:29,14–19; see LW 31:357.
59. To borrow the German title of the book by Ernst Käsemann, Der Ruf der Freiheit, translated into English by Frank Clarke under the title Jesus Means Freedom, (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1968).


61. See above, the text cited in note 17 from “Philosophy and Critical Theory.”

63. See above, the text by Marx cited and documented in note 32. This notion also gives some indication of the approach and center of Hegel’s philosophy. SeeMarcuse, Hegel’s Ontology and the Theory of Historicity, trans. Seyla Benhabib (Cambridge, MA: MIT, 1987), 15.

64. K. Marx, Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844 (see above, note 29), 106–107. Ruled out here to begin with is the metaphysical question about the origin of humanity, but also any Christian doctrine of creation and eschatology. Therefore, it is not clear why Helmut Gollwitzer (The Christian Faith and the Marxist Criticism of Religion [Edinburgh: The Saint Andrew Press, 1970], 76 note 17) considers whether “what is here at stake is the right definition of the human self, man’s character as subject within his relationship with God.” On the interpretation of Marx’s view, see Werner Post, Kritik der Religion bei Karl Marx (Munich: Kösel, 1969), 202–205.

65. For this, Marcuse appeals to Luther’s interpretation of the fourth commandment in the sermon “On Good Works” § 12: temporal authority, “whether it does right or wrong, cannot harm the soul” (53 = LW 44:92 = WA 6:259,12f. = Cl 1:282,6f.), but he suppresses the decisive limitation that immediately follows: “unless, of course, it should try openly to compel us to do wrong against God or men” (LW 44:92 = WA 6:259,13f. = Cl 1:282,8f.).
66. See the formulation found at the end of the first section of the sermon “On Good Works,” which is instructive for Luther’s understanding of the relation between faith and love: in labor “suffering compels faith to call upon God’s name and to praise him in such suffering.” Hence, “faith goes out into works and through works comes back to itself again.” (LW 44:79 = WA 6:249,27–29,32f. = Cl 1:272, 40f.; 273:5f.). This does not mean that faith would only be itself in love, for it exists before works because it is itself God’s work. What is emphasized here rather is that faith not only initiates love, but remains its origin.

67. See merely Hegel’s preface to the 6th edition of his Phänomenologie des Geistes, ed. J. Hoffmeister (Meiner, 1952; PhB 114), 20f. and Hegel’s Reason in History (see above note 41), 47–51. Marcuse’s critique is that for Luther, human freedom “can never be the result of an action” (57).

68. In the Marxist view of the Reformation, Müntzer always comes across as the one who consistently carries Luther’s theology forward and completes it with action. See, for example, M. Steinmetz, “Zu einigen Problemen der frühbürgerlichen Revolution in Deutschland” (in Lehr, Forschung, Praxis. Die Karl-Marx-Universität Leipzig. On the 10th anniversary of its name-giving, May 3 1963, ed. G. Haris and M. Steinmetz, 1963), 235: “Müntzer’s significance for German history and for us today ultimately lies in the fact that he has preserved the best of Luther’s achievements in his own action.” Müntzer’s “merit is to have overcome the contradictions and half-heartedness in Luther’s work; he completed what Luther began, but could not and would not finish.” (M. Steinmetz, “Reformation und Bauernkrieg in Deutschland als frühbürgerliche Revolution” [Sonderheft der Zeitschrift für Geschichte, 1965], 50). Steinmetz propounded the thesis that the Reformation should be understood as an early bourgeois revolution. Thus, he interpreted it purely socially and politically and claimed that the Peasants’ War of 1525 was the climax of a popular movement to shift Germany away from feudalism and the church towards capitalism and a centralized nation-state.

69. Thomas Nipperdey, “Die Reformation als Problem der marxistischen Geschichtswissenschaft” (in Wissenschaft in kommunistischen Ländern, ed. Dietrich Geyer, [Tübingen: Wunderlich, 1967]), 237. This presentation grew out of an intensive engagement with the subject and offers, in my opinion, the clearest and most circumspect non-Marxist introduction to the topic.


71. Leo Stern, “Die geschichtliche Gesamtlage Deutschlands zur Zeit der Gründung der Universität Wittenberg. Ein Studie der materiellen und ideologischen Triebkräfte und Auswirkungen der deutschen Reformation” (in 450 Jahre Martin-Luther-Universität Halle-Wittenberg I, 1952), 41; here also we find the keyword “princes’ lackey.”

72. “For freedom is . . . the condition of unfreedom” (52). Compare: “This unfreedom caused by the internalization of freedom . . .” (63). See above I and II.2.

73. This is comprehensively presented for the first time in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church (1520) where Luther reflects on the relation between the promise (promissio) and faith (fides).

74. See the section on baptism in On the Babylonian Captivity of the Church, especially LW 36:78 = WA 6:541,1–9 = Cl 1:476, 6–17).

Compare Luther, To the Christian Nobility of the German Nation (1520), LW 44:127–133, WA 6:407–411 = Cl 1, 366–370 (Attack against the first “wall” of the “Romanists”).

76. “For Germany’s revolutionary past is theoretical, being the Reformation. Once it was the monk’s brain in which the revolution began, now it is the philosopher’s.” See “Towards a Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction” in Karl Marx: Selected Writings (see above note 28), 69.

77. The key word “inner-worldly asceticism” occurs also on p. 59. Incidentally, Marcuse’s presentation agrees with one of Horkheimer’s remarks in “Egoism and the Freedom Movement” (see above note 5): “Max Weber stressed the rationalistic trait of the bourgeois mind, but irrationalism is from the start no less associated with its history” (41).

78. They are that for Marcuse because “man is, in the most dangerous sense of the word, free from God and can become free to himself” (63). See below IV.

79. “Although Christians are free from all works, they should in this freedom empty themselves, take upon themselves the form of a servant . . . and become a sort of Christ to the neighbor” (Freedom of a Christian, LW 31:366f. (trans. alt.); WA 7:65, 26, 32f.; 66:27; see the German text § 27).

80. Freedom of a Christian, German text § 26 (WA 7:34, 32f.). Compare LW 31:365; WA 7:64, 35–37: “Here faith is truly active through love [Gal. 5:6], that is, it goes out in works of the freest service, cheerfully and lovingly done, with which a person willingly serves the neighbor without hope of reward; and for himself he is satisfied with the fullness and wealth of his faith.”

81. LW 31:365 (trans. alt.); WA 7:64, 26f.


84. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (see above note 50), 121 (trans. alt.).


86. WA 7:38, 6–8 = Cl 2:27, 18–20; see LW 31:371.

87. This is clear especially from The Bondage of the Will (1525): “But the dogma concerning the freedom of confession and satisfaction, either you deny it or you do not know that it is the Word of God . . . We, however, know and are sure that it is God’s Word by which Christian freedom is asserted, so that we may not allow ourselves to be trapped and brought into bondage by human traditions and laws” (LW 33:54; WA 18:627, 24–26 = Cl 3:118, 15–19). The problem here is that of “charging the common people with abusing the preaching of free confession and satisfaction and turning it into carnal liberty” (LW 33:48; WA 18:624, 5f. = Cl 3:114, 31–33). The assertoric preaching of Christian freedom (“And by assertion . . . I mean a constant adhering, affirming, confessing, maintaining, and an invincible persevering:” LW 33:20; WA 18:603, 12f. = Cl 3:97, 33–35) is not bound to a particular place or to particular persons or particular times or particular conditions since Christ wants it to come among people and to rule them freely worldwide (LW 33:56; WA 18:628, 30–32 = Cl 3:119, 29–31). This does not happen without strife. “This is the constant fate of the Word of God, that the world is kept in a state of tumult because of it” (LW 33:52 [trans. alt.]; WA 18:626, 8f.; see 625:13–17 = Cl 3:116, 25f.; see 115:36–40). “The world and its god cannot and will not endure the Word of the true God, and the true God neither will nor can keep silence; so when these two Gods are at war with one another, what can there be but tumult in the whole world?” (LW 33:52; WA 18:626, 22–24 = Cl 3:117, 2–5).
88. LW 33:52; WA 18:626,26f. (or lines 6f.).
89. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 5), 148f.
90. In *Freedom of a Christian*, he refers to Paul’s use of this term, especially 2 Cor. 4:16 (LW 31:344; WA 7:50,5–12), and so stands within the Augustinian tradition. On the tradition history in detail, see Ulrich Duchrow, *Christenheit und Weltverantwortung Traditionsgeschichte und systematische Struktur der Zweireichelehre* (Stuttgart: Klett, 1970). See esp. 587.
91. Of course, we must not overlook the fact that theology, chiefly in the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, understood Luther’s two kingdoms doctrine dualistically (see Duchrow, *Christenheit*, 582–584) and also that Wilhelm Herrmann, in Neo-Kantian fashion, identified the two kingdoms more or less with the moral realm and the natural realm. If Marcuse is critical of the neo-Kantian interpretation of Luther, then from the standpoint of Luther himself he is completely vindicated.—Meanwhile, Eberhard Jüngel has energetically sought to rescue the schema that distinguishes between the “inner” and “outer” man from misunderstanding and to show that it is indispensable for the interpretation of Luther’s freedom tractate as well as necessary for systematic theology: *Freedom of a Christian: Luther’s Significance for Contemporary Theology*, trans. Roy A. Harrisville (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1988), 47ff. At the same time, Jüngel is of the opinion that “the theological situation signaled in that distinction need not be expressed in these terms” (*Freedom of a Christian*, 52).
92. “But the holy orders and true religious institutions established by God are these three: the office of priest, the estate of marriage, the civil government” (Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528; LW 37:364 = WA 26:504,30f. = Cl 3:510,17f.). See Duchrow, *Christenheit*, (see above note 90), 495–512 and the additional literature cited there.
93. “Above these three institutions and orders is the common order of Christian love, in which one serves not only the three orders, but also serves every needy person in general with all kinds of benevolent deeds, such as feeding the hungry, giving drink to the thirsty, forgiving enemies, praying for all people on earth, suffering all kinds of evil, etc. . . . ” (Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528; LW 37:365 [trans. alt.] = WA 26:505,11–15 = Cl 3:510,34–38).
94. See above note 93.
95. See above note 91.
97. In a similar vein, M. Stöhr writes on “Max Horkheimer und die Theologie” in DtPfrBl (70, 1970, 339f.).
98. See the confrontation that W. D. Marsch attempts (in *Utopie der Befreiung und christliche Freiheit. Theologischer Versuch über Herbert Marcuse* [PTh 58, 1969]) (28–34), in relation to Marcuse’s whole work (20–28)—with a triple focus on Heidegger, Marx and Freud—under the banner of the “three basic Christian judgments on the human condition before God: as creature, as sinner, and as justified” (28).
100. Alfred Schmidt offers a very instructive study of this attempt and its contradictions in the context of Marcuse’s writings during the years 1928–1933 in “Existential-Ontologie und historischer Materialismus bei Herbert Marcuse” (in *Antworten auf Herbert Marcuse*, edited and introduced by Jürgen Habermas [Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp], 1968, 17–49).
101. See above notes 32 and 29.
102. “This communism . . . is the true resolution of the strife between existence and essence, between objectification and self-confirmation, between freedom and necessity, between the individual and the genus. Communism is the riddle of history solved, and it knows itself to be this solution” (Economic and Philosophic Manuscripts [see above note 29], 97).

103. H. Marcuse, “Philosophy and Critical Theory” (see above note 3), 143 (emphasis mine). See Max Horkheimer in his “postscript” to “Traditional and Critical Theory” (see above note 4), 250: “Dialectical theory does not practice any criticism based solely on ideas . . . It does not judge by what is beyond time but by what is within time.”


106. Günter Rohrmoser, Das Elend der kritischen Theorie (Rombach, 1970), 82 (in the context of pp. 82f.).


108. R. Steigerwald, (see above note 104) 97.

109. See Schleiermacher, who is very different from Luther in his definition of faith but agrees with him that faith is “neither a knowing nor a doing” (The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart [Philadelphia: Fortress, 1976] § 3, and also On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, trans. John Oman [New York: Harper and Row, 1958], Second Speech). It is worth considering whether an analogous orientation is possible also in Hegel’s sphere of influence so that the demarcation made above would again become questionable. Bruno Liebrucks, for example, says in his “Reflections on Hegel’s statement, ‘The truth is the whole,’” in Zeugnisse: Theodor W. Adorno zum 60. Geburtstag, ed. M. Horkheimer [1963], 112, that “the statement, ‘the truth is the whole’ is no mere theoretical insight, just as it cannot be practical instruction for action. It is rather to be understood in the light of that unity of theoretical and practical reason that appears at the end of Hegel’s Logic. From this unity, evocative statements follow, made in full awareness of the presumption they contain: that the finite human creature pokes his head out of the waters of finitude. This presumption is justified because it is the condition of the possibility of all humanity.”

110. G.W.F. Hegel, Phenomenology of Spirit (see above note 50), 193. See above note 67.